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Chapter 1 
Intersectionality, Race-Gender Subordination,  
and Education
AngelA HArris
University of California, Davis
Zeus leonArdo
University of California, Berkeley
In this chapter, we unpack intersectionality as an analytical framework. First, we cite 
Black Lives Matter as an impetus for discussing intersectionality’s current traction. Second, 
we review the genealogy of “intersectionality” beginning with Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
formulation, which brought a Black Studies provocation into legal discourse in order 
to challenge existing antidiscrimination doctrine and single-axis theorizing. The third, 
and most central, task of the chapter is our account of intersectionality’s utility for social 
analysis. We examine some of the issues raised by the metaphor of the intersection and 
some of the debates surrounding the concept, such as the tension between fragmenting 
and universalizing perspectives mediated by the notion of “strategic essentialism.” Fourth, 
we review how education researchers have explained race and gender subordination 
in education since Ladson-Billings and Tate’s Teachers College Record article. We 
conclude with some remarks concerning future research on intersectionality.
In the summer of 2014, as accounts of brutal and unjustified police killings of Black people circulated across social media and mass media in the United States, a new 
social movement came to prominence (Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark, 2016). Black 
Lives Matter (BLM, also called the Movement for Black Lives) emerged from a July 
2013 Twitter hashtag and became a mass movement in the wake of the 2014 killing 
of Michael Brown by Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri. Like other 
American social movements that have arisen to protest group subordination, BLM 
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has been tagged as an instance of “identity politics” and criticized for its allegedly 
single-minded and exclusionary focus—notably, under a competing Twitter hashtag, 
#AllLivesMatter (Freelon et al., 2016). Yet a closer look at the way the founders of 
BLM describe their campaign reveals a far more sophisticated analysis. On their web-
site, the BLM founders declare that their movement is explicitly built on principles 
of intersectionality.1
As one public health scholar defines it,
Intersectionality is a theoretical framework for understanding how multiple social identities such as race, 
gender, sexual orientation, SES [socioeconomic status], and disability intersect at the micro level of 
individual experience to reflect interlocking systems of privilege and oppression (i.e., racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, classism) at the macro social-structural level. (Bowleg, 2012, p. 1267)
In this chapter, we provide an overview of “intersectionality” as a theoretical frame-
work, assessing its utility and its limitations. We recognize that given the widespread 
embrace of the term—which provoked some at the 2014 American Studies 
Association conference to call for its abandonment (Bartlett, 2017)—our investiga-
tion is necessarily anything but exhaustive.2 Reflecting our respective disciplinary 
homes, our focus in this review is on the literatures of law and education.
MEtHodoLoGy
A search through “all content” in the Westlaw legal database on June 7, 2017, 
turned up 2,979 uses of the word “intersectionality” in “all state and federal” sources, 
with 2,706 uses of the word appearing in the secondary literature. We read and ana-
lyzed the 50 most cited articles using the term in the Westlaw database. These “top 
50” articles were supplemented, based on our familiarity with the literature, with 
another 10 to 15 legal articles proposing substitutes for the term. To find works still 
in press, we searched the combination of the terms intersectionality and discrimination 
in the Legal Scholarship Network thread of the Social Science Research Network, 
obtaining the 50 most recently posted papers using both these terms.3
A keyword search on “intersectionality and education” in the ERIC database gen-
erated 214 results for books and articles. We whittled down this number by privileg-
ing works that use intersectionality as a descriptor of the author’s analysis, that is, as 
an analytic framework rather than a proxy for arguments about diversity or multiple 
identities in education. We do not center a more general uptake of the concept that 
predates Crenshaw’s formulation without any specific connection with her work on 
race-gender subordination since the end of the 1980s.
As with the search in the legal database, as experts in the field we supplement the 
ERIC search with knowledge of the research literature in education wherein intersec-
tionality appears in the analysis, such as works inspired by critical race theory (CRT) 
by authors within that specialization. Since intersectionality in education is still a 
recent methodological or conceptual innovation, at this point any terminological 
substitutes for Crenshaw’s formulation have been few and negligible, some 
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suggestions notwithstanding (Núñez, 2014), and therefore are not part of the meth-
odology for the search in education.
We are aware that several recent books also examine “intersectionality” and its 
provenance. These include monographs by Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge 
(2016), and by Ange-Marie Hancock (2016), as well as edited collections (see, e.g., 
Berger & Guidroz, 2010; Grzanka, 2014). We also note that the legal scholar most 
often credited with the invention of the term—Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw—has 
her own book in press on the topic.
GEnEaLoGy
In their monograph exploring “intersectionality” as a modern-day “key concept,” 
Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge (2016) acknowledge that the word has been 
taken up in a broad variety of contexts, from the academic to the political to the 
popular everyday.4 They also remind the reader that although the term is usually said 
to have been “coined” by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1991, a more accurate 
genealogy would follow the concept back to women of color scholar-activists work-
ing in liberation-focused social movements at least as far back as the 1960s and 
1970s, if not before.5 A well-known example they discuss is the Combahee River 
Collective’s “A Black Feminist Statement,” written in 1977, which analyzes the role 
of heterosexism and homophobia in Black women’s lives along with capitalism, rac-
ism, and patriarchy. Collins and Bilge also go back further to highlight the 1970 
publication of the anthology The Black Woman, edited by Toni Cade Bambara. In 
their view, this anthology conveyed the message that “black women would never gain 
their freedom without attending to oppressions of race and class and gender” (Collins 
& Bilge, 2016, p. 66). They call special attention to Frances Beal’s chapter, which had 
been originally published as a pamphlet in 1969. In “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black 
and Female,” Beal examines the workings of capitalism, racism, and sexism in Black 
women’s lives. According to Collins and Bilge, “Her approach is systemic: her double 
critique of patriarchy within the Black Power movement and of racism in the white 
women’s liberation movement also criticizes capitalism” (p. 66).
For Collins and Bilge (2016), uncovering this broader genealogy of “intersection-
ality” is important because it reveals both the centrality of the concept to social justice 
movements and the tendency for ideas circulated by professional academics to be 
privileged over the same ideas circulated by grassroots intellectuals. Indeed, they 
argue that the widespread (scholarly) attribution of the term to Crenshaw is an effect 
of academic politics. In their account, university and college programs and depart-
ments of Black Studies, women’s studies, and ethnic studies were instituted in the 
1970s in response to widespread campus insurgency by students of color, who 
demanded scholarship and teaching relevant to their concerns. Because of their 
“political” origins, these departments and fields of study were consistently marginal-
ized in colleges and universities, and the faculty associated with them were often 
suspected of flouting norms of academic rigor. Women of color students and faculty 
who fought their way into academia to establish and grow these programs brought 
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the ideas associated with what would become “intersectionality” with them, but as 
Collins and Bilge note, these new “insiders” also fell subject to the pressure to obey 
institutional norms such as the injunction to conduct “dispassionate” scholarship, to 
embrace the theory of the “romantic author,” and to avoid social “activism.” For 
Collins and Bilge, Crenshaw’s supposed 1991 “invention” of intersectionality serves 
to reconcile these tensions:
A new umbrella term might enable coalition building among the exponentially growing study areas of 
race, class, and gender. Naming the field might also help legitimate the kind of scholarship produced 
within these areas by making it more compatible with academic norms of discovery, authorship and 
ownership. Attributing the discovery of the term “intersectionality” to Kimberlé Crenshaw fits these 
academic norms. (Collins & Bilge, 2016, pp. 80–81)
Collins and Bilge (2016) warn, however, that this new academic provenance of 
“intersectionality” created the risk that the term’s debt to radical social justice orga-
nizing would be lost. Indeed, Bilge (2013) argues that White feminists have already 
attempted to claim the term as their own, erasing its origin in the struggles of women 
of color.
Nevertheless, BLM (and Crenshaw’s own organization, the African American 
Policy Forum) testifies to the continued centrality of intersectionality as a framework 
for social justice activism. What about academia? In the next section, we reflect on 
the utility and limitations of intersectionality in social theory generally, before turn-
ing to its employment in the disciplines of law and education.
IntERSECtIonaLIty and SoCIaL tHEoRIzInG:  
SoME GEnERaL obSERvatIonS
Although most recent academic reflections on “intersectionality” acknowledge its 
ubiquity in contemporary scholarship on identity and difference, the term has had 
many competitors. Within legal scholarship alone, rival formulations include “inter-
locking oppressions” (Kalsem & Williams, 2010), “wholism” (Cunningham, 1998), 
“multidimensionality” (McGinley & Cooper, 2013), “inter-connectivity” (Valdes, 
1995), “co-synthesis” (Kwan, 1997), “complex bias” (Kotkin, 2009), and “symbiosis” 
(Ehrenreich, 2002). Scholars have also offered metaphors other than an intersection 
for understanding the phenomenon, including the “Koosh ball” and the “Rubik’s 
cube.” Collins and Bilge (2016) might argue that these rival formulations were 
prompted by the continuing institutional lure of intellectual credit. For us, the mul-
tiple competing terms also indicate the utility of intersectionality—and its limita-
tions as a tool of critical social theory.
One point seems indisputable: within the world of social theory, we are all inter-
sectionalists (if that is a word) now. Descriptively, “intersectionality” provides a less 
cynical way to understand the steady emergence of new perspectives and fields of 
study within academia; scholars informed by the concept are constantly prompted to 
ask, “What or who is obscured by this analysis or focus of attention?” Prescriptively, 
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“intersectionality” serves as a powerful reminder to pay attention to the margins of all 
identity-based organizing and analysis. The title of a well-known anthology says it all: 
All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave (Hull, Bell-
Scott, & Smith, 1982).
Intersectionality disrupts group-based formulations such as “women,” “people of 
color,” and “sexual minorities” in at least three ways. First, intersectionality calls 
attention to social identities that are consistently treated as marginal or invisible 
because they are conceptualized as mere subsets of broader, larger, or more “signifi-
cant” assemblages. Second, intersectionality points to the complex nature of power, 
undermining all reductive theories of oppression.6 This move also helps scholars and 
organizers resist the “oppression Olympics”—the desire to have one identity (usually 
one’s own) or form of subordination acknowledged as more important or fundamen-
tal than others (see Smith, 2006). That said, although intersectionality research 
attests to the interplay between social organization and power, it does not put forth a 
particular theory of power as such. Third, intersectionality points to the gap between 
social categorization and the complexity of intersubjective experience: the fact that 
no single social label—female, Black, bisexual, poor—can ever exhaust what it means 
for an individual to travel in the world, and therefore that no analysis or label is ever 
complete.
These disruptions have proved powerful within academia, helping scholars 
develop new perspectives on old problems and call attention to invisible or ignored 
justice claims (for a public health example, see Bowleg, 2012). Intersectionality has 
been generative for scholars in at least three ways. First, the concept has inspired 
scholar-activists to look for identities and forms of subordination made invisible by 
hegemonic formulations, and to develop increasingly sophisticated and nuanced 
understandings of social formations. This increasing sophistication is visible among 
scholars and activists alike. For example, within legal scholarship, CRT and feminist 
theory have given rise to “LatCrit” (Latinx critical theory),7 Asian American jurispru-
dence, queer theory, and “Dis/Crit” (critical disability theory). Similarly, conscious-
ness of the intersectional nature of sexual minority oppression has produced a series 
of increasingly complex identity terms used for organizing, from “homosexual” to 
“gay and lesbian” to “LGBT” to “LGBTQIA+” and beyond. Many of the organizers 
of these new initiatives, moreover, acknowledge the need to keep their borders fluid 
in light of the tendency of more privileged identities to obscure the needs and experi-
ences of the less privileged (see, e.g., Matambanadzo, Valdes, & Vélez-Martinez, 
2016, p. 443, remarking on LatCrit’s emergence from a sense of frustration at the 
marginalization of Latinx identity within CRT and LatCrit’s decision to maintain a 
“strategic anti-essentialism” going forward).
Second, consciousness of intersectionality has led scholars and scholar-activists to 
pay attention to the structural interpenetration of various forms of oppression 
(Matambanadzo et al., 2016, p. 445, avowing a commitment to “critical engage-
ments of sex, gender, and sexuality, together with race, gender, and class, as interlock-
ing categories and systems in programmatic terms”). The days of unthinking 
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intellectual “essentialism” seem to be behind us, at least in the humanities, the social 
sciences, education, and law. Instead, critical social theorists routinely acknowledge 
that any specific focus will address some forms of subordination while neglecting 
others, such as Marxism’s class-reductive limitations when attempting to explain race 
and gender relations, which is not necessary to rehearse here.
Third, given the dynamic nature of social identity formation, intersectionality 
promises a continuous generativity. Collins and Bilge (2016) observe that this is 
nicely fitted to an institutional world in which academics always need new topics for 
conferences, panels, dissertations, and research agendas. More important, however, 
intersectionality reminds us of the inexhaustibility of the struggle for social justice. 
For any given analysis, initiative, or campaign of resistance at any given point in time, 
no matter how narrowly or broadly specified, there will always be a remainder, some 
identity or experience that is marginalized or made invisible. Intersectionality is in 
this way well suited to the postmodern view that political and social groups are con-
tinually emerging and making claims for recognition and redistribution—that there 
is no point at which all identities will be recognized and all justice claims satisfied (see 
Butler, 1990, p. 182; see also Connolly, 1995, p. 186). Justice is an endlessly receding 
horizon—a recognition that may be disheartening but that accords with experience.
Intersectionality, however, also has its limitations, which have led some scholars to 
declare a “postintersectionality” moment (see Levit, 2002) and others, as noted above, 
to call for its linguistic “death.” One of these limitations, which has led to various 
rival formulations, is the “intersection” metaphor itself. In her University of Chicago 
Legal Forum article, Crenshaw (1989) asks us to conceptualize intersectionality based 
on the metaphor of a roadway:
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, 
like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident 
happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, 
sometimes, from all of them.8
One criticism of the intersection-as-road metaphor is that it calls up a mental rep-
resentation of two-dimensional space—a limitation shared by the Venn diagram, also 
used by some scholars to represent intersectionality (see Elengold, 2018, for a discus-
sion). The “Koosh ball” metaphor and “multidimensionality” as an alternative term 
have emerged in response to this concern.9 A second critique of the intersection meta-
phor is that it does not reflect the multiple levels of scale at which each axis of subor-
dination operates—for example, race acts on individual, interpersonal, institutional, 
and structural levels simultaneously. This has led some critics to worry about uses of 
intersectionality that, for example, give primacy to “psychology” or subjective “iden-
tity” at the expense of structural subordination (see, e.g., Williams, 2002).10 A third 
critique of the intersection metaphor is that it implicitly figures all forms of subordina-
tion as parallel—lending itself to the reduction of intersectionality to a glib list—“race, 
class, gender, sexuality, disability”—that fails to explore what is distinctive about each 
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form of oppression, and/or fails to explore any particular axis in any depth.11 Fourth, 
the intersection-as-road metaphor might be misunderstood to suggest that the nature 
of subordination is fixed and unchanging, like a road, rather than endlessly shifting 
and changing in response to political, social, and economic conditions.
A theory of metaphor is appropriate to invoke insofar as linguistic representation 
cannot be said to occur after an event or as the attempt to capture it post facto. In 
other words, as a constitutive element of a social activity system, mediation tools like 
language, and more specifically metaphor, function as dialectical nodes in the rela-
tionship between material reality and the meaning, or sign, system (see Leonardo, 
2016; Ricoeur, 1975; Vygotsky, 1978). In Vygotsky’s (1978) Mind in Society, lan-
guage, speech, and sign are described as part of the “alloy” that makes up meaning 
and material life. Understood this way, the intersectional metaphor is less a way to 
represent through a convenient linguistic trope an existing reality but rather struc-
tures how we arrive at a particular understanding of a certain reality. Therefore, it is 
a choice that comes with educational consequences and political commitments. In 
the literature, the metaphor of an “intersection” has been helpful in grasping the limi-
tations of single-axis explanations in favor of a cross-cutting analysis. As such, this 
discussion highlights the power of metaphor to define constitutively the terrain under 
investigation while avoiding the dangers associated with portraying social life as 
somehow “made of language,” otherwise known as linguistic idealism. Volosinov 
(2006), puts it this way:
The individual consciousness, for its part, is deprived of any support in reality. It becomes either all or 
nothing. . . For idealism it has become all . . . For psychological positivism, on the contrary, consciousness 
amounts to nothing. (p. 12)
In its best moments, intersectionality represents the solder in the alloy between 
speech and the social conditions that make it possible.
Second, intersectionality’s limitation is that it is not itself a “theory” in the scien-
tific sense: It cannot generate any testable predictions about the world and therefore 
can only supplement rather than replace empirical methods (see Bowleg, p. 1268, 
calling intersectionality a “theoretical framework” rather than a “theory”). Here, 
intersectionality’s seeming death blow to single-axis theorizing has arguably left a hole 
in social theorizing. Because “grand theories” such as Marxism and dominance femi-
nism are out of fashion, we are left with the vague sense that all forms of oppression 
are always everywhere but with no new analytical tools with which to explore and 
understand these forms and how they operate. Some “postintersectionality” scholars 
have been moved by this limitation to develop their own theories of how forms of 
subordination interact (see, e.g., Valdes, 1995, on “interconnectivity”; see also 
Ehrenreich, 2002). Others have simply enjoined scholars to investigate all forms of 
subordination at all times (see, e.g., Kwan, 1997), without providing specific tools 
with which to do so. Still others have argued that the attempt to derive a theory from 
intersectionality is inappropriate “metatheoretical musing” (see Bilge, 2013, p. 411).
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Third, intersectionality contains only a partial account of power. Scholars 
guided by intersectionality are led to understand that systems of subordination, as 
they are brought to bear on social identities, never travel alone: For instance, race 
always operates through gender, and gender through sexuality. However, intersec-
tionality does not tell us which of the multiple layers of oppression and/or experi-
ence represented by a given “intersection” is most consequential at any given time, 
or how and why class, say, works differently from disability.12 This limitation has 
impelled scholars both to criticize intersectionality and to offer their own supple-
mental formulations. For example, Darren Hutchinson worries that “it is impos-
sible to theorize about or study a group when each person in that group is ‘composed 
of a complex and unique matrix of identities that shift in time, is never fixed, is 
constantly unstable and forever distinguishable from everyone else in the universe’” 
(as quoted by Elengold, 2018, p. 16). Legal scholar Nancy Ehrenreich argues that 
intersectionality scholars have ignored the situation in which actors are simultane-
ously privileged and oppressed, and offers the concept of “hybrid intersectionality” 
in response (Ehrenreich, 2002, p. 257). Legal scholar Mari Matsuda, like Crenshaw 
a founder of CRT in law, offers “looking to the bottom” as an ethical and political 
goal of organizing and social theorizing, thus providing the focus that intersection-
ality alone lacks—but raising the question—where is the bottom?—(Matsuda, 
1987). Other scholars and activists simply use intersectionality as a supplement to 
their own theories of power, whatever those might be. As Collins and Bilge (2016) 
point out, however, intersectionality’s incomplete theory of power places it one 
dangerous step away from diversity, a term that has been used to efface power analy-
sis altogether (see also Berrey, 2015). Intersectionality differs from the more estab-
lished tradition of multiculturalism in education. Although the two interventions 
are certainly compatible, the latter’s focus on diversity differs from the former’s 
emphasis on subordination that results from asymmetrical power relations. 
Addressing diversity without addressing subordination eschews the process whereby 
race and gender difference is produced ideologically and materially. In other words, 
uncritically promoting diversity in education and social institutions may not neces-
sarily challenge subordination.
Finally, a fourth difficulty with the academic uptake of “intersectionality” is best 
laid at the feet of those who have misunderstood its point. As Leslie McCall points 
out, the concept can be employed toward at least three different theoretical ends: to 
criticize and dismantle accepted categories (what McCall calls demonstrating “anti-
categorical complexity”), to hold up for analysis the experiences of dismissed or 
ignored groups (what McCall calls employing “intra-categorical complexity”—an 
example is the work of Black feminists from which the term intersectionality emerged), 
and to permit scholars, holding one category or axis of oppression constant, to inves-
tigate its interplay with other axes of oppression (what McCall calls the demonstra-
tion of “intercategorical complexity”; McCall, 2005). A rigid fidelity to anticategorical 
complexity, however, can be used to undermine projects of intra- and intercategorical 
complexity; the result may be the complaint, sometimes heard, that intersectionality 
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makes categorization itself impossible. As McCall notes, however, this complaint 
betrays a conflation of the different projects that “intersectionality” makes possible; it 
is not a limitation of the term itself.
IntERSECtIonaLIty In Law
Crenshaw is a legal scholar, and her initial use of the term was a critical response 
to some judicial interpretations of federal employment discrimination law. In this 
section, we offer some reflections on the uptake of “intersectionality” in jurispru-
dence—that is, its use by lawyers, legislators, and judges rather than academics.
Although as noted above, a search for “intersectionality” in Westlaw yielded 2,979 
uses of the word, the vast majority of the references (2,706) were in the secondary 
literature. Legislators, attorneys, and judges, by and large, have not embraced the 
term as have scholars and activists. This would not be troubling if the substance of 
Crenshaw’s original critique were being addressed by other means or under other 
rubrics. Unfortunately, this is only partially the case.
Some background on Crenshaw’s critique of Title VII jurisprudence may be help-
ful. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal statute, prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Writing 
at the end of the 1980s, Crenshaw noted that some judges interpreting this language 
treated each of the grounds for antidiscrimination protection—race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin—as separate and mutually exclusive. For these judges, moreover, 
the benchmark for sex discrimination was the experience of a White woman, and the 
benchmark for race discrimination, the experience of a Black man. Black women, 
according to this framework, could only claim to have been discriminated against on 
the basis of sex if their experiences were identical to those of White women, and 
conversely could only claim to have been discriminated against on the basis of race if 
their experiences were identical to those of Black men. “Compound” discrimina-
tion—the experience of being discriminated against specifically as a Black woman—
was not recognizable under the law.
Crenshaw (1989) argued that this approach to Title VII was wrongheaded. She 
wrote,
Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to and different from those 
experienced by white women and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination in ways 
similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet 
often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the 
basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women—
not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women. (p. 149)
Have courts and legislatures gotten the message? Kate Sablosky Elengold (2018) 
argues that the answer in the United States is no. She cites a 2011 empirical study of 
employment discrimination actions, in which the authors, examining a representa-
tive sample of judicial opinions over 35 years of federal employment discrimination 
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litigation, concluded that the presence of intersectionality “dramatically reduce[d 
the] odds of plaintiff victory” (Best, Edelman, Krieger, & Eliason, 2011).13 Elengold 
(2018) summarizes their findings:
Plaintiffs exhibiting identification with more than one traditionally subordinated group (“demographic 
intersectionality,” also known as a “complex claimant” or an “intersectional” [claimant]) and/or plaintiffs 
who allege discrimination on the basis of overlapping ascriptive characteristics (“claim intersectionality” or 
“intersectional discrimination”) are less successful in employment discrimination actions. (p. 6)
This is despite the fact that claims involving intersectionality are increasing. According 
to Best et al. (2011),
In the 1970s and 1980s, less than 10 percent of EEO [equal employment opportunity] opinions dealt with 
intersectional claims. . . . [T]he proportion began rising around 1990, and by the second half of the 
decade, more than a quarter of EEO opinions involved intersectional claims. (p. 1008)
Nevertheless, the study authors found that both claim intersectionality and demo-
graphic intersectionality were damaging to plaintiffs in court. Indeed, true to 
Crenshaw’s original critique, “non-white women are less likely to win their cases than 
is any other demographic group” (Best et al., 2011, p. 992).14
Elengold (2018) puts forth several reasons for the continued failure of judges to 
recognize intersectionality in employment discrimination cases. First is the “pro-
tected category” structure of the statute itself, which invites judges to slot worker 
experiences into distinct boxes and to find “comparators” based on one characteristic 
at a time. This “check the box” approach makes the interaction between categories of 
discrimination difficult to recognize, and also may encourage judges to fear the 
“many-headed hydra” that might result were they to recognize the existence of mul-
tiple simultaneous types of discrimination.15 Second, Elengold notes the reliance of 
attorneys on “stock stories” of discrimination. Despite Crenshaw’s criticisms, these 
stock stories continue to center on the stories of White female plaintiffs in sex dis-
crimination cases and Black male plaintiffs in race discrimination cases. Third, 
Elengold takes note of the forms produced by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (the federal agency charged with managing Title VII administrative 
complaints) for would-be litigants to fill out. These forms, like Title VII itself, repre-
sent discrimination as a series of separate and distinct boxes to be checked, ignoring 
the possibility of subcategories or category interaction.
Intersectionality has been somewhat more successfully incorporated into interna-
tional human rights law and European Union (EU) law. With respect to interna-
tional law, Campbell (2015) explains that the United Nations (UN) recognizes two 
“mainstream” human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
These treaties contain antidiscrimination clauses that are phrased, like Title VII, in 
terms of a list of protected “grounds” or categories of discrimination. The committees 
interpreting these treaty provisions have explicitly affirmed the concept of 
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intersectionality.16 Nevertheless, implementation has been difficult, in part due to the 
category-bound language of the treaties themselves.
Paradoxically, treaties that on their face recognize only single-axis discrimination 
have been more user-friendly for intersectional litigants and claims. Several interna-
tional treaties protect the rights of specific groups, such as the Convention for the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). As Campbell (2015) 
observes, CEDAW on its face requires single-axis analysis: There is no reference to 
categories of discrimination other than “sex” and “women,” which has led other 
scholars to conclude that it does not recognize intersectionality. This apparent weak-
ness, however, Campbell argues, has actually enabled CEDAW’s interpreters to 
employ intersectionality, in the form of “intercategorical complexity.” Campbell calls 
attention to the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No. 28, which 
states that “the discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably 
linked with other factors that affect women, such as race ethnicity, religion or belief, 
health, status, age, class, caste, sexual orientation and gender identity” (Campbell, 
2015, p. 489). Campbell concludes, “The conception of women in CEDAW is not 
based on a privileged sub-set of women but encompasses all of their identities” (p. 
489).17
Intersectionality has also been explicitly embraced by some international law 
advocates. In November 2000, an expert group organized by the UN Division for the 
Advancement of Women, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
and the UN Development Fund for Women convened to and “identified seven areas 
where gender and racial discrimination overlap—including, inter alia, criminal jus-
tice, population movements, trafficking and armed conflict—the concept of intersec-
tionality was expressly examined” (Chow, 2016, p. 10).18 Similarly, interpretation of 
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has produced a “holis-
tic” structural approach to discrimination that embraces intersectionality.19 This is 
perhaps not surprising; as Grzanka (2014) notes, Crenshaw penned a background 
paper on race and gender discrimination for the 2000 UN World Conference on 
Racism that explained the concept of intersectionality in some detail.
The antidiscrimination law of the EU has adopted the term multiple discrimina-
tion rather than intersectionality. Bullock and Masselot (2012–2013) explain,
Although multiple discrimination is not defined in any legally binding EU text, in the context of EU law, 
scholars use multiple discrimination to refer to “all instances of discrimination on several grounds contained 
in [the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 9] and in other instruments. (p. 62)
Bullock and Masselot (2012–2013) observe that EU advocates have been 
extremely active in promoting the recognition of intersectionality. Nevertheless, EU 
antidiscrimination law has been beset by the “list” problem. It is also not clear 
whether the countries of the EU have properly reckoned with the structural focus of 
intersectionality. For example, Kantola (2014) observes that EU directives on multi-
ple discrimination have successfully prodded Nordic member states to adopt 
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antidiscrimination provisions covering a variety of different grounds in addition to 
gender, but she doubts that these developments add up to a “genuine engagement 
with intersectionality” (p. 12). Instead, she fears, the result is a heightened focus on 
individual rights, rather than “structures and employers’ or public authorities’ respon-
sibilities to remove barriers to equality” (p. 13).
It must be concluded, therefore, that in the field of law, scholars have embraced 
the concept of intersectionality (not without vigorous attempts at substituting other 
terms and metaphors), but judges and legislators, by and large, have not. More than 
two decades after the introduction of the idea into the legal literature, full legal rec-
ognition of the intersectional nature of discrimination remains elusive.
IntERSECtIonaLIty and EduCatIon
After its recent 25th anniversary, the term, concept, or analytical framework 
of intersectionality has had a significant impact on the field of education. Many 
collections under the moniker of CRT in education include a chapter on, section 
on, or frequent mention of intersectionality (e.g., see Dixson & Rousseau, 2017; 
Lynn & Dixson, 2013; Taylor, Gillborn, & Ladson-Billings, 2009). We might 
credit the first CRT-inspired Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) article in educa-
tion with jump-starting the use of intersectionality. But when they write, “[W]e 
discuss the intersection of race and property as a central construct in understand-
ing a critical race theoretical approach to education” (p. 58), their deployment of 
intersectional thought implicates race with property relations. They gesture to 
Cheryl Harris’s (1995) chapter on “whiteness as property” to argue that CRT in 
education becomes the fulcrum for a critique of White liberalism as well as a 
certain lack of militancy they find in multiculturalism. In this early stage of CRT 
in education, intersectionality represents less the full measure of Crenshaw’s 
innovation but rather a more commonsense term that suggests a connection 
between two levels of analysis bridged by the image of a meeting point between 
them. Moreover, because Ladson-Billings and Tate center the power of whiteness 
in education, intersectionality functions through analogy rather than as an ana-
lytic concept in its own right.
When Ladson-Billings and Tate’s breakout article engages Crenshaw, it occurs 
with respect to her 1988 Harvard Law Review article’s concerns around the ambiguity 
of civil rights legislation. They do not cite her University of Chicago Legal Forum 
article that appeared a year later in 1989, which contains the inchoate form of inter-
sectional analysis, or the Stanford Law Review article from 1991 that would eventu-
ally become the main text for understanding the framework of intersectionality. 
Their argument is more in line with a single-axis explanation centered on race, with 
class or property relations as a species of the race genus. That is, insofar as property 
rights are tied to race, race relations are not linked to a Marxist explanation of eco-
nomic antagonism. This early conceptual framing between education and intersec-
tionality warrants some historical context for two reasons.
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One, after several decades of writings that interrogated Eurocentrism, multicul-
turalism became institutionalized in schools, corporate thinking, and public dis-
course. Such institutionalization meant that White interests converged with 
multiculturalism’s intent to racially uplift non-White students, the former arguably 
compromising the latter project in a way that Bell’s (2005) work could predict CRT 
in education becomes an alternative to the dominant framework of multiculturalism. 
The narrative of race subordination found in CRT competes with multiculturalism’s 
model of multiple acculturation. It is possible to interpret this move as an intellectual 
break but equally possible to regard it as a continuity, with CRT being the next, and 
historically specific, stage of race analysis in education, perhaps the heir apparent to 
multiculturalism. In Ladson-Billings and Tate’s first article on CRT in education, the 
authors challenge the discipline to extend beyond liberal multiculturalism toward a 
more militant form of race scholarship based on CRT in legal studies as a new or 
emerging tradition. Two, and with respect to intersectionality, Crenshaw’s innovation 
had not yet taken hold by 1995, with Ladson-Billings and Tate’s article having been 
crafted only a couple years after her original works on intersectionality appeared on 
the scene; it was not yet the cause célèbre. At this stage, the Ladson-Billings and Tate’s 
(1995) article is not an intersectional argument in Crenshaw’s sense despite its use of 
the term. That established, the 1995 article that “launched a thousand publications” 
(Leonardo, 2013, p. 4) inaugurates CRT in education out of which intersectionality, 
whether in Crenshaw’s specific sense or a general twoness inherited from Du Bois 
(1989), becomes a dominant trope, at minimum, or an analytical framework, at 
maximum.
Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) opened the door into which an entirely new way 
of making sense of the immanently racial nature of education enters. Out of this, 
intersectionality emerges as a key concept that unlocks the education house that race 
made, not only from the obvious racialized achievement gap but also all the way 
down the educational enterprise, from disciplinary policies (Parker & Stovall, 2004), 
to the overdiagnosis and overreferral of Black students to special education (Artiles, 
Dorn, & Bal, 2016), to teacher education in general (Milner, 2010). From Danielle 
Davis et al.’s (2015) collection, Intersectionality in Educational Research, or S. Hancock 
and Warren’s (2017) White Women’s Work: Examining the Intersectionality of Teaching, 
Identity, and Race in the United States, to Bhopal and Preston’s (2012) Intersectionality 
in Education in the United Kingdom, intersectionality becomes a favored framework 
in CRT in education, arguably rivaled only by appropriations of Derrick Bell’s (2005) 
“interest convergence” and counterstorytelling methodology (1992), and Harris’s 
(1995) analogy between whiteness and property.
To editors Bhopal and Preston (2012), the role of intersectional analysis in educa-
tion has been decisive. Going well beyond the race-gender system, the career of inter-
sectionality in education has been fecund for studying the general process of othering. 
To Brah and Phoenix (2009), intersectionality has roots in Sojourner Truth’s injunc-
tion “Ain’t I a Woman?” to challenge the essentialist notion of “woman” (and we may 
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add “Black”; see Dumas, 2010; Hall, 1996). Brah and Phoenix “regard the concept 
of ‘intersectionality’ as signifying the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects 
which ensue when multiple axis of differentiation. . . intersect in historically specific 
contexts” (p. 248). Intersectionality’s effects on education scholars have been felt to 
such an extent that it includes any explanation about overlapping systems of oppres-
sion, psychological, social, or otherwise.
Once CRT becomes established in education, the term intersectional(ity) prolifer-
ates in the discipline’s lexicon, from K–12 (Thomas & Stevenson, 2009) to higher 
education studies (Museus & Griffin, 2011), from physics education (Leyva, 2016) 
to physical education (Flintoff, Fitzgerald, & Scraton, 2008). Its closest ally, LatCrit, 
highlights immigration status and how the ability to speak languages other than 
English play a central role in the marginalization of Latinx youth (e.g., Covarrubias, 
2011; Perez-Huber, 2010; Yosso, 2005). Even the actual consonant “x” in Latinx or 
Filipinx, symbolizes an intersection in a way that few letters, other than the “t,” can 
claim. It becomes increasingly difficult to invoke the academic term casually, without 
any reference to Crenshaw’s formulation, even when investigating relations of subor-
dination not limited to a race-gender synthesis. It is similar to going down the rabbit 
hole of studies of ideology without any trace of Marx. Like Ladson-Billings and Tate 
(1995), Milner (2013) uses intersectionality generally when he writes,
It is important to note that examining the intersection of race and poverty can provide a lens for researchers 
and consumers of the findings of research to disentangle the role and salience of race in the educational 
experiences, opportunities, and outcomes of the libraries for particular students. (p. 28)
Noteworthy is Milner’s (2013) use of the word “disentangle,” arguably an attempt to 
isolate the “race effect” in studies of poverty rather than entangle race with class rela-
tions as coaxiomatic (cf. Grosfoguel, 2007). One finds a comingling of race and class 
micro aggressions in Sarcedo, Matias, Montoya, and Nishi’s (2015) study where they 
document what they call “raceclassist microaggressions” that first-generation, low-
income college students of color suffer. Appropriating Cheryl Harris’s (1995) cele-
brated chapter on whiteness as property, Leonardo and Broderick (2011) argue that 
within a racialized study of disability, smartness functions ideologically like a form of 
property, thus intersecting race/whiteness with ability studies without referring to 
Crenshaw (cf. K. Young, 2016).
As CRT and intersectionality make their way across the discipline of education, 
their influence is accommodated into well-established paradigms. For instance, 
Volume 2 of James Banks’s four-volume Encyclopedia of Diversity in Education con-
tains extended sections on intersectionality. A long and introductory entry on inter-
sectionality is written by Grant and Zwier (2012), followed by another entry on 
“Intersectionality of race, class, gender, and ethnicity” by Caruthers and Carter 
(2012; see also Grant & Zwier, 2011). Although more closely associated with multi-
culturalism, Grant and Zwier provide a lengthy genealogy of intersectionality in the 
social sciences, which centers Crenshaw but includes other influences like Patricia 
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Hill Collins (2000) and Iris Marion Young (1990). As such, Grant and Zwier (2012) 
broaden the history of intersectionality beyond Crenshaw when they state, “There is 
not one theory of intersectionality, but different conceptualizations and theoretiza-
tions of it, such as ‘vectors of oppression and privilege,’ ‘interlocking systems,’ and 
‘multiple jeopardy’” (p. 1263). Additionally, they add concerns that intersectional 
analysis’ strength is also its weakness, mainly that it demands too much complexity 
and sophistication from writers and readers. The following entry by Caruthers and 
Carter, by contrast, places intersectionality squarely within Crenshaw’s scholarship 
even as they expand its analytic borders beyond race and gender. To the latter authors, 
its applicability in education may be found in the “hypervisibility” of African 
American males, who are under constant surveillance and punitive relations within 
schools (cf. Ferguson, 2001).
In key instances, intersectional analysis in education maintains fidelity with 
Crenshaw’s original deployment. To the extent that educational scholars work hard to 
avoid siphoning off the “race problem” in order to forge a single-axis explanation, 
intersectionality enjoys engagement as a way to explain how racism and sexism, as 
co-constitutive systems of subordination, reinforce each other (Powers & Duffy, 
2016). Their implication with each other is not meant to be additive but multiplica-
tive, where race and gender subordination mutually impair or disable people of color 
as always raced, gendered, and inferiorized subjects in the eyes of whiteness and patri-
archy. In a sense, intersectional scholars spin an elliptical explanation that revolves 
around at least two axes. Here, the metaphor of the ellipse is more appropriate than 
the circle to the extent that the former contains two centers around which social and 
educational analysis orbits. Intersectionality illuminates the way that race and gender 
gravitationally tug on each other.
This dynamic is made accessible when we consider that Black girls or boys in 
school do not experience themselves as ultimately either racialized or gendered 
subjects, other than the return to a troublesome essentialism that Crenshaw set out 
to problematize. For instance, Annette Henry (2015) remains close to Crenshaw’s 
imbrication between race and gender relations, beginning with the lived experi-
ences of Black women aligned with Patricia Hill Collins (2000; see Willis, 2015, 
for an intersectional study of Black women who study abroad). In this sense, black-
ness is not an empty or mysterious box that scholars fill with nationality, race, class, 
language, and gender but a site of their simultaneity. Brah and Phoenix (2009) 
seem to agree when they trace the earlier history of intersectional thought from 
Sojourner Truth, the Bridge (Called My Back) collective, and onward, placing 
intersectionality within a larger and longer struggle of women of color against “all 
final closures” (p. 249), with particular alliances organized around “cultural speci-
ficities” (p. 251).
This point does not prevent powerful interventions in education, which focus, 
for example, on Black boys. In other words, there is a specificity to the Black male 
experience in education and the micro aggressions they suffer, which warrants 
focused attention (Hotchkins, 2016). At the University of Pennsylvania’s Graduate 
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School of Education, a concerted effort has been under way to change the represen-
tation and uplift the prospects of African American and Latino males in education. 
The Journal of African American Males in Education is dedicated solely to issues 
affecting the population signaled by its title. Obama’s initiative, “My Brother’s 
Keeper,” is another such effort that focuses on increasing achievement for Black 
boys, sometimes attracting criticism for suggesting that this population is what 
needs changing rather than addressing structural mechanisms that limit their 
chances (Dumas, 2016). Valuable insights on Black males in education notwith-
standing, a parallel focus on Black girls or Latinas in schools does not exist in the 
same magnitude, making the integration between gender and race at the level of 
analysis a matter of political choice that warrants critical reflection (Morris & Perry, 
2017; Murphy, Acosta, & Kennedy-Lewis, 2013).
In this chapter, our interpretation is also that such a premium on the dynamism 
between interlocking social systems does not preclude beginning from racial analysis. 
A critical analysis of education may begin strategically with race without ending on a 
single-axis explanation. This is warranted especially if a context wherein race antago-
nism erupts provisionally requires that race is privileged as the overarching relation 
under investigation. In other words, as understood here, intersectionality was not 
meant to displace race as much as it was innovated to recognize its full measure of 
power that accounts for gender, class, and language rather than their absence. Said 
another way, an intersectional race analysis is arguably stronger in its ability to trace 
the objective and far-ranging effects of race than its weaker form found in single-axis 
analysis (cf. Harding, 1991, on strong vs. weak objectivity in the sciences). But this 
does not suggest that race is always an inappropriate beginning for any study, just as 
BLM spreads (and not always by Black activists) precisely when Black lives are under 
extreme threat through police shootings and other state-sponsored violence. The 
same may be said about privileging gender analysis when discrimination against 
queer and trans students attracts public scrutiny, including challenging bathrooms 
based on gender “assignment” in public institutions like schools.
Beginning analysis is a matter of context and strategic choice, of how to proceed 
based on what is immediately at stake, and likelihoods for success based on history 
and experience in social movements. To begin, as Said (1985) reminds us, is provi-
sional and not originary, is secular not religious (i.e., grounded on sacred texts and 
issues), and occurs in fits and starts rather than an unfolding teleology toward a pre-
determined end. In this political condition, intersectionality is educative to the extent 
that it provides guidance, principles, and the possibilities of praxis across difference 
rather than laying claims to an essentialist subject of both oppression and liberation 
from it. It does not designate ahead of time and at which juncture of analysis inter-
sectionality makes its appearance.
At its best, intersectionality is the ability to name racism even while acknowledging 
that racism is not the only culprit in a particular crime. Intersectionality graces 
Gillborn’s (2015) article title even as he puts sharp focus on racism in education, 
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admitting preemptively that his readers may be confused by the contradiction of 
“link[ing] the idea of ‘intersectionality’ and the ‘primacy’ of racism in the same sen-
tence” (p. 277). He argues, “‘Intersectionality’ is a widely used (and sometimes mis-
used) concept in contemporary social science” (p. 278); to this, we might include 
education. Reminding us that the African American Policy Forum, run and directed 
by Crenshaw, defines intersectionality as a tool of analysis and resistance, Gillborn 
warns against liberalizing the concept. Delgado (2011) regrets that “intersectionality 
can easily paralyze progressive work and thought because of the realization that what-
ever unit you choose to work with, someone may come along and point out that you 
forgot something (p. 1264)” (as cited by Gillborn, 2015, p. 279). This point is key as 
intersectionality ascends into popularity and descends into commonsense usage. Based 
on his study of Black middle-class parents in the United Kingdomn (see Ball, Rollock, 
Vincent, & Gillborn, 2013; Gillborn, Rollock, Vincent, & Ball, 2012), Gillborn 
argues that the entanglement among race, gender, and ability relations affects middle-
class Black parents in a way that complicates their class privilege (i.e., fails to protect 
them). In this way, the multiple social forces in education bring up the “primacy of 
race and racism” at the empirical, personal-biographical, and political levels.
To be extra clear, Gillborn (2015) disabuses himself of being mistaken as a race 
determinist. He adds,
I do not assume that racism is the only issue that matters . . . neither do I believe that racism is always the 
most important issue in understanding every instance of social exclusion and oppression that touches the 
lives of minoritized people. Similarly, I am not suggesting that there is some kind of hierarchy of oppression, 
whereby members of any single group (however defined) are assumed to always be the most excluded or to 
always have a perfect under-standing of the processes at work. (p. 284)
With the success that intersectionality has enjoyed in education comes certain dan-
gers. As Gillborn, Delgado, and Crenshaw herself have diagnosed, much like the 
maligned or malunderstood term critical, intersectionality’s edge is experiencing a 
certain rounding. Although it clearly has stood the test of time and shown its power 
to explain race and gender subordination, intersectionality also faces domestication. 
Although it challenges the problems of essentialism and provides education scholars 
the ability to explain subordination more, it is in danger of explaining it less by flat-
tening out the concept. The discipline would do well to guard against this trend.
That said, the intersectional framework has experienced particularly fruitful con-
nections with dis/ability studies. Annamma, Connor, and Ferri (2013) inaugurated 
“DisCrit,” or the intersectional uptake of critical disability studies with CRT in edu-
cation. DisCrit consists of at least three intellectual commitments: (a) to legitimate 
studies of subjects with disabilities outside of the medicalized/interventionist dis-
course, including mainstream special education; (b) to advance ability as a theoretical 
construct in its own right to explain intertwining social relations such as race and 
gender; and (c) to challenge normativity as a regulating principle (Annamma, 
Connor, & Ferri, 2016b). As a move to racialize ability and disable-ize race (see 
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Erevelles, 2002), DisCrit aligns itself with Crenshaw, whose “work on intersectional-
ity [they find] useful for theorizing the ways in which race and ability are likewise 
intertwined in terms of identity” (Annamma, Connor, & Ferri, 2016a, p. 16), despite 
the authors’ admission that ability concerns rarely appear in Crenshaw’s work. The 
challenge for DisCrit and synergies aside is that at the same time it aligns itself with 
CRT, it fights against being confounded with it, right down to the tenets it closely 
appropriates from CRT (Mutua & Robinson, 2017). Some disarticulation may be 
necessary.
ConCLuSIon and FutuRE dIRECtIonS In IntERSECtIonaL 
RESEaRCH on EduCatIon
One overarching implication of intersectional analysis is that dismantling one 
form of hierarchy necessitates an equally robust assault on other forms of subordina-
tion. Because racism and sexism recruit capitalism, sexuality, methodology, and epis-
temology to their work, problem-posing proceeds organically. In education research, 
it means seeking a composite methodology and analytic that speak to this complexity. 
It is unarguable that intersectionality occupies a special place in critical understand-
ings of race and gender stratification in education, distinguishing mainstream uses of 
intersectionality from its critical version. Equally, it is important to push intersection-
ality into novel and significant ways so as to build frameworks that express their debt 
to Crenshaw’s formulation as well as take intersectionality into new directions.
For this, we return to Crenshaw’s original intervention that intersectionality may 
be a metaphor but should not be reduced to a convenient motif that peppers schol-
arly arguments. Beyond explaining the lives of Black women, for example, critical 
intersectionality aims to improve their social condition as part of an overall intellectual 
project. The move to speak to the multiplicity of subordination cannot be accom-
plished absent a clear attempt to explain and alleviate the challenges experienced by 
Black women and other marginalized groups. Taking heed of this warning, intersec-
tional analysis maintains its integration of how the compounding effects of social 
forces, such as patriarchy and racism, limit the lives of despised or denigrated races 
and genders in education, the law, and social life in general. It should explain more, 
rather than less, this very process.
Our interpretation of the literature leads us to conclude that intersectionality dis-
places neither race nor gender as readymade social systems in order that these previ-
ously concrete forces melt into abstractions. It does not straitjacket analyses that 
begin with race or gender as hopelessly essentialist but builds from them as starting 
points for an appropriate intersectional synthesis. At this point, intersectional analy-
sis becomes a relative practice insofar as there exists no standard to designate ahead of 
time how many axes to intersect and in what manner within one’s analysis. As such, 
intersectionality is less identity-centered and more the apprehension of conditions 
that shape and make meaningful these same identities as they crisscross and make 
cuts in each other.
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To this end, research on intersectionality marks a new space for theorizing race 
and gender subordination in education as well as possible responses to it. It requires 
that concepts like micro aggression graduate to a complexity that documents the 
intersectional effects of conditions whereby race, class, sexuality, and gender are no 
longer separable at the politico-existential level even if they may be disaggregated at 
the conceptual level for explanatory purposes. Intersectional microaggressions (Nadal 
et al., 2015) occur precisely as the meanings of gender, race, and other social systems 
exert multiplicative, rather than additive, pressure on vulnerable communities. It 
means that resistance takes on an intersectional dimension when protest against the 
minimization of Black lives is articulated, for example, with a deep appreciation for 
Islamo- and Chicanophobia. Intersectional resistance becomes valued for its ability to 
work at nonessentialized understandings of social suffering despite the ostensible 
inadequacies of the language we use to name it, such as Black Lives Matter or the 
struggle in the discrimination against queer or trans lives. This is the self-reflective 
moment of the intersectional framework, which interrogates the conditions of intel-
ligibility that make intersectional thought possible in the first place.
The apparatus of schooling is an intersectional meeting point, rather than the 
melting pot, of forces in the interpellation of the student as a subject on one hand 
and the nation creation project that is education on the other. This means that the-
ory, method, and practice are distinguishable as conceptual tools but inseparable as 
politics. As such, intersectionality becomes a guiding framework at all levels of analy-
sis, from inception (of an idea), to conception (of the study), and intervention (into 
the problem; see Maramba & Museus, 2011). At its broadest, intersectionality 
becomes a standpoint from which to view educational problems and possibilities, 
human limitations and liberations.
It is intersectionality as a form of intervention in the lives of people of color and 
women, or specifically women of color, with which we want to end here. Said another 
way, intersectional analysis’ power is accorded by its intellectual project that is at the 
same time an educative-political project, or education in the broadest sense possible 
as the creation of a critical citizenry. Several decades later and with recent events that 
make this work more pressing, such as the public emboldening of White supremacist 
groups, attacks on universities, and procurement of “hate” speech even if it has legal 
standing, developing intersectional work in education makes the intellectual simulta-
neously political. As the former, one of the deep tasks of academic work is involved 
in the development of ideas and production of knowledge. As the latter, it reminds us 
that knowledge is best understood as politics in its conceptual form. Together, the 
intersection between the intellectual and political becomes a proxy for praxis.
A posting on its website announces that BLM “stands with Standing Rock” in 
opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline, a project resisted by the Standing Rock 
Sioux and their allies through direct action in the winter of 2015:
As there are many diverse manifestations of Blackness, and Black people are also displaced Indigenous 
peoples, we are clear that there is no Black liberation without Indigenous sovereignty. Environmental 
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racism is not limited to pipelines on Indigenous land, because we know that the chemicals used for 
fracking and the materials used to build pipelines are also used in water containment and sanitation plants 
in Black communities like Flint, Michigan. The same companies that build pipelines are the same 
companies that build factories that emit carcinogenic chemicals into Black communities, leading to some 
of the highest rates of cancer, hysterectomies, miscarriages, and asthma in the country. Our liberation is 
only realized when all people are free, free to access clean water, free from institutional racism, free to live 
whole and healthy lives not subjected to state-sanctioned violence. America has committed and is 
committing genocide against Native American peoples and Black people.20
This eloquent statement indicates that intersectionality has become a central com-
mitment of one of the most vibrant new social movements in the United States. As 
we have seen, however, this deep understanding of and commitment to intersection-
ality is not shared in the academy. Despite the fact that we are all nominally “inter-
sectionalists” now, social theorists in law and education continue to struggle to 
incorporate fully the lessons of this subtle but endlessly generative concept, although 
in the field of praxis intersectionality continues to bear fruit.21 Intersectionality 
reminds us of the importance of coalitions and allyship; it reminds us to be humble 
and to look for who is missing in the room. Above all, however, intersectionality 
reminds us—BLM reminds us—that our liberation is only realized when all beings 
are free.
notES
 1Black Lives Matter, “A HerStory of the Black Lives Matter Movement,” http://black-
livesmatter.com/herstory/.
 2A Google search on October 28, 2017, for instance, yielded 3,630,000 results for the 
word “intersectionality.”
 3Because our analysis is not comparativist in nature, the following review does not con-
centrate on authors’ particular contexts and their nation-specific arguments. Our methodology 
focuses instead on the uptake of intersectionality as a framework for race research, especially 
our sense of its growing influence in U.S. scholarship.
 4They write,
College students and faculty in interdisciplinary fields such as women’s studies, ethnic 
studies, cultural studies, American studies, and media studies, as well as those within soci-
ology, political science, and history and other traditional disciplines, encounter intersec-
tionality in courses, books, and scholarly articles. Human rights activists and government 
officials have also made intersectionality part of ongoing global public policy discussions. 
Grassroots organizers look to varying dimensions of intersectionality to inform their work 
on reproductive rights, anti-violence initiatives, workers’ rights, and similar social issues. 
Bloggers use digital and social media to debate hot topics. Teachers, social workers, high-
school students, parents, university support staff, and school personnel have taken up the 
ideas of intersectionality with an eye toward transforming schools of all sorts. Across these 
different venues, people increasingly claim and use the term “intersectionality” for their 
diverse intellectual and political projects. (Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 1)
 5Crenshaw herself points out that Sojourner Truth’s famous intervention at the 1851 
Women’s Convention in Akron, Ohio—her “Ain’t I a Woman?” speech—could be under-
stood as an example of “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1989, p. 153). Indeed, contrary to the 
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standard origin story, Crenshaw’s 1991 Stanford Law Review article was not even her own 
first use of the term. “Mapping the Margins” relied on, and referred to, a 1989 article pub-
lished in the University of Chicago Legal Forum called (somewhat awkwardly) “Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (Crenshaw, 1989). It was in this earlier article that 
Crenshaw first used the word “intersectionality.”
 6Patricia Hill Collins puts this well:
Intersectionality’s ability to draw attention to and account for inter-social relations—
including those on the margins—challenges binary thinking, shifting the analytic focus 
on the fluidity among, interrelationships between, and co-production of various catego-
ries and systems of power. As a result, epistemologically, intersectionality highlights the 
various standpoints that “inter” social locations occupy; these alternative standpoints 
challenge truth claims advanced by historically powerful social actors. (Collins, 2012, 
p. 454)
 7Indeed, the recent emergence of the term Latinx can be seen as a case study in intersec-
tional consciousness. The term is currently used as a nongendered substitution for the gendered 
term Latino/a, which in turn emerged in response to the masculine-gendered term Latino.
 8Crenshaw (1989, p. 149).
 9Legal scholars Ann McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper (2013), for example, acknowl-
edge the value of “intersectionality” but adopt “multidimensionality” instead, explaining,
The metaphor of intersectionality suggests two cars traveling down roads that collide 
at an intersection. The metaphor of multidimensionality more readily suggests a world 
that exists at many levels, with trains underground, planes above, and other automo-
biles on the roads. At the level of metaphor, although intersectionality theory might be 
understood as two-dimensional, multidimensionality theory clearly encompasses three 
dimensions. It is not that one cannot read the original intersectionality articles to imply 
multiple dimensions, but we think one is more likely to consider multiple identities and 
contexts when thinking about the multidimensionality of identities. (p. 335; see also 
Hutchinson, 1997, p. 641)
10Somewhat similarly, Patricia Hill Collins (2012) argues that intersectionality should 
be identified in a number of different domains. McGinley and Cooper (2013) argue that the 
cultural realm of intersectionality is too often ignored, and argue that “multidimensionality” 
does this job better.
11As Judith Butler (1990) notes, reeled-off lists like “race, gender, class, sexuality” “invari-
ably close with an embarrassed ‘etc.’ at the end of the list . . . these positions strive to encom-
pass a situated subject, but invariably fail to be complete” (p. 182). The implicit equation of 
the “class” dimension of subordination as homologous to other dimensions has come under 
particular fire from academics. For one well-known example, see Fraser and Honneth (2003).
12For a similar criticism of a cognate term now prevalent in sociology—“super-diversity,” 
see Foner, Duyvendak, and Kasinitz (2017).
13The authors of this study explored two different senses of “intersectionality:”
[W]e formulate and investigate two different constructs: demographic intersectionality, in 
which the courts are the site of intersectional disadvantages or discrimination, and claim 
intersectionality, in which the law does not adequately redress intersectional discrimina-
tion that occurs in the labor market. Demographic intersectionality can be thought of 
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as a type of inequality in litigation, while claim intersectionality can be thought of as a 
mismatch between discrimination as conceptualized by law and discrimination as experi-
enced in the labor market. (Best et al., 2011, p. 993)
14According to the study’s authors:
Bivariate relationships between both claim and demographic intersectionality and case 
outcomes yield strong support for intersectionality theory. First, plaintiffs making inter-
sectional claims are less than half as likely to win their cases as are other plaintiffs (15 
percent compared to 31 percent; see Table 4). Second, race and sex disadvantages do not 
operate independently. White male plaintiffs were more likely to lose their cases than 
white women were (61 percent as compared to 55 percent; see Table 4). This female 
advantage, however, does not apply to black women, who are slightly more likely than 
black men to lose their cases (71 percent as compared to 69 percent; see Table 4). (Best 
et al., 2011, p. 1009)
15A similar structure of multiple “grounds” articulated within antidiscrimination legisla-
tion has apparently retarded attempts to legally recognize intersectionality in Canada, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom (Campbell, 2015).
16Campbell (2015) explains,
There is no reference to intersectional discrimination in the text of either the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, but both CESCR and the HRC have addressed intersectional dis-
crimination in the General Comments. CESCR observes that “some individual or groups 
of individual face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited grounds . . . such 
cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact . . . and merits particular 
consideration and remedying” (idem). In the context of gender discrimination the HRC 
notes that “discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on 
other grounds . . . states parties should address the ways in which instances of discrimina-
tion on other grounds affect women in a particular way . . .” (HRC, General Comment 
No. 28, § 30). This remains an essentially grounds-based approach that examines the 
interaction between enumerated or analogous status-based grounds. (p. 484)
17Chow (2016), however, is concerned that the emphasis on structural intersectional-
ity in CEDAW (a) has obscured the fact that multiple identities are not invariably negative, 
(b) has encouraged a purely “additive” approach to intersectionality, and (c) has obscured 
women’s resilience and creativity in resisting their own oppression. Chow views the approaches 
to intersectionality embraced by interpreters of CEDAW as overly focused on “intercategorical 
complexity” and recommends more “intracategorical” analysis to understand how categories 
themselves are produced and reproduced.
18The group wrote,
The idea of “intersectionality” seeks to capture both the structural and dynamic conse-
quences of the interaction between two or more forms of discrimination or systems of 
subordination. It specifically addresses the manner in which racism, patriarchy, economic 
disadvantages and other discriminatory systems contribute to create layers of inequality 
that structure the relative positions of women and men, races and other groups. Moreover, 
it addresses the way that specific acts and policies create burdens that flow along these 
intersecting axes contributing actively to create a dynamic of disempowerment. (As cited 
in Chow, 2016, p. 10)
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19General Recommendation No. 25 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Committee on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, for exam-
ple, requires the states party to the convention to give consideration to four different aspects of 
racial discrimination experienced by women: (a) its “form and manifestation,” (b) the circum-
stances under which it occurs, (c) its consequences, and (d) the “availability and accessibility of 
remedies and complaint mechanisms” (see Chow, 2016, p. 16). Chow argues that in this context, 
UN human rights treaty bodies have been able to “make visible the sophisticated ways in which 
‘social differences and inequalities are embedded in existing hegemonic power relations’” (p. 16).
20http://blacklivesmatter.com/solidarity-with-standing-rock/.
21Patricia Hill Collins (2012) argues that from this perspective, intersectionality and 
pragmatism are aligned and have much to offer each other.
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